

The Social Integration of Practitioners of Non-Western Religions in the United States

ROBERT WUTHNOW

CONRAD HACKETT

Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus have become an increasingly significant part of American religion in recent years. Yet scholarship on these groups has been limited largely to case studies and qualitative observations. We analyze data from a large national survey that permits comparisons among Muslims, Buddhists, Hindus, Jews, and Christians. The data reveal that members of non-Western religions in the United States resemble Jews in having notably higher socioeconomic status than Christians. They resemble the rest of the population on other measures of actual or potential social integration, including political knowledge, generalized trust, neighborhood contacts, and interreligious ties. However, low levels of voting, a tendency to express feelings of alienation, and fewer connections with community elites suggest a continuing lack of political integration.

Through new immigration and conversions, a sizable increase in the number of Muslim mosques, Buddhist temples and meditation centers, and Hindu temples in the United States has taken place during the past three decades. This increase raises significant questions about diversity and pluralism in American religion and society. Are the members of these non-Western religions being integrated into the wider society? Do their social resources facilitate or impede the process of integration? Will the process be similar to that of American Jews or will it follow a path that more closely resembles Protestant fundamentalists or marginalized sects? And will it be shaped by conditions common to non-Western religions or will there be significant variations?

Previous research on Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus in the United States has focused on religious practices, forms of local social organization, and modes of adaptation to American culture. Muslims include substantial numbers of African-American converts as well as immigrants from the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia (Numan 1999). The mosque or Islamic center is the primary form of local organization, serving both as a place of worship and as a community center that provides education, language training, and social services. There were an estimated 3,000 mosques in the United States in 2000, two-thirds of which were founded after 1980 (Ostling 2001). Muslim services follow a near-universal pattern of ritual prayers and sermons in Arabic, with notable cultural adaptations, such as sermon explanations in English and greater inclusion of women at services (Smith 1999). Buddhist practices in the United States vary according to country of origin, tradition (Mahayana, Theravada, or Vajrayana), ratios of converts to immigrants, and teachings associated with particular leaders and schools (Seage 1999; Prebish 1999). Although social distance between monks and lay practitioners appears to be smaller in the United States than in other countries, and efforts have been made to encourage temple involvement (sangha) and voluntary social service, lay practice often remains centered in family and personal life (Tuck 1988; Lin 1996; Cadge 2001). One study that identified more than 1,000 Buddhist meditation centers found nearly 70 percent had been established since 1985 (Morreale 1998). Besides its success in attracting converts, Buddhism grew during this period from immigration and refugee resettlement, especially from Southeast Asia, and temples proliferated both by embracing ethnic diversity and through ethnic and religious schisms (Numrich 2000). Hindu temples and community

Robert Wuthnow is Andlinger Professor of Sociology, Princeton University, Wallace Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544. E-mail: wuthnow@princeton.edu

Conrad Hackett is a graduate student in the Department of Sociology, Princeton University, Wallace Hall, Princeton, NJ 08544. E-mail: chackett@princeton.edu

centers are generally eclectic in religious and ethnic traditions, but deities and practices often differ depending on the dominance of north or south Indian traditions (Rayaprol 1997; Jacob and Thaku 2000; Williams 1998). Activities at Hindu temples include daily rituals of prayer and devotion (pujas), weekly classes, and periodic festivals (Larson 1994; Williams 1994). Cultural adaptations include greater participation in temple activities among women and greater emphasis on personal deities (DuPertuis 1987; Kurien 1999). These observations derive almost exclusively from qualitative case studies and thus emphasize the internal aspects of local congregations and worship centers. Because surveys of larger populations include too few members of non-Western religions, quantitative research that might shed light on the relationships between members of these religions and the wider society has been virtually nonexistent.

In this article we use data from a recent survey (Putnam 2001) that has a sufficiently large number of respondents to provide information about Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus in the United States. We compare their responses with those of Christians and provide further perspective on the similarities and differences by including responses from Jews. We focus on questions about the degree to which Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus have become integrated into American society.

Questions about the integration of non-Western religions are particularly important. Casual observations differ widely in their assessment of how well these religions are being integrated. Some observers argue that integration is happening readily because members adopt Western lifestyles, adjust their beliefs and practices, and mingle with neighbors and co-workers who, for the most part, accept religious differences and borrow freely from alternative religious traditions (Albanese 2000; Eck 2001). According to these observers, non-Western religions are also being incorporated into the wider society by attracting converts who are already well integrated. Others cite social isolation and subcultural differences that may separate immigrants from the native-born population, alienation from established social institutions among converts to non-Western religions, new concerns about separation of church and state, bias against non-Western religions among Christian groups, and hate crimes toward religious minorities as evidence that these groups are not easily being integrated into the wider society (Massanari 1998; Goodstein and Niebuhr 2001).

We propose a view of social integration that focuses less on lifestyle similarities to Westerners and more on resources and participation in the wider society. We argue that the concept of social capital is a useful starting place for understanding this kind of social integration, and suggest that the multidimensionality of social capital needs to be emphasized for understanding how religious groups are socially integrated.¹ We show that Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus in the United States have strong potential for being integrated into the wider society because of high educational capital, that there are some indications that they remain politically unintegrated despite high levels of political knowledge, that there are variations in generalized trust but also indications of alienation, that friendship patterns reveal interpersonal ties but raise questions about integration into community power structures, and that measures of religious integration suggest mixed patterns.

SOCIAL INTEGRATION OF RELIGIOUS GROUPS

We begin by distinguishing between two perspectives on the social integration of religious groups. What might be termed a *phenomenological* approach emphasizes the meaning of practices and beliefs in religious groups and how group members construct individual and collective identities; it stresses the processes by which lifestyles and self-perceptions change, the strategies of resistance and accommodation that occur within groups, and variations among members in exposure to and acceptance of different traditions and teachings (Geertz 1973; Orsi 1985; Griffith 1997). A *structural* approach emphasizes groups' social resources and the broader social arrangements in which groups become embedded; in this perspective, groups interact with the wider society, construct and occupy social niches, compete with other religious groups, and develop

their identity in relation to structures of power (Yang and Ebaugh 2001; Smith 1998). Although the phenomenological approach is more useful for describing the internal dynamics of religious groups, the structural approach provides a clearer way of thinking about groups' relationships to the larger society.

Adopting the structural perspective, we argue that non-Western religions' integration into U.S. society is problematic because of these religions' newness to the United States and because their beliefs and practices fall outside the Christian teachings that a majority of Americans regards as normatively true and thus may encounter greater resistance or misunderstanding on the part of this majority. Although norms of religious freedom, tolerance, and respect for human rights make it possible for non-Western religions to be accepted as part of civil society, the degree to which their members become fully integrated into the society depends not only on public tolerance but also on the resources these groups have at their disposal.

The concept of social capital (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993) provides a useful way of thinking about the resources that religious groups can mobilize in order to become integrated into the society. Social capital includes network ties and associated norms (such as trust) that help groups accomplish their goals. Scholars distinguish between social capital that promotes internal cohesion within subgroups and social capital that links subgroups to the wider society (Frank and Yasumoto 1998). The kind of social capital that builds bridges is most relevant to questions about social integration. Although social capital is sometimes viewed as if it were solely a property of goal-oriented groups, the structural perspective we adopt here emphasizes that social capital is embedded in and shaped by larger social arrangements, such as the stratification system, government, and community power structures (Skocpol and Fiorina 1999; Putnam 2001). Social capital manifests itself in several ways that have been of interest to scholars focusing on questions about social integration and civic well-being: socioeconomic status (a generalized resource and an influence on access to other forms of social capital), political engagement (signaling involvement, a sense of entitlement, and a means of exercising political influence), trust (a norm that encourages cooperation and reflects a feeling of efficacy), and interpersonal network ties (as general resources and as particular ties to people in power); in addition, religion (as a source of significant social relationships) is often considered a form of social capital (Putnam 2000; Ammerman 1997; Park and Smith 2000).

Socioeconomic Status

Attaining higher education and achieving associated income and prestige is one of the principal ways new or marginalized religious groups can become integrated into the wider society. Higher education can be regarded as a generalized resource that translates into employment in professional and managerial occupations, higher income, and greater cultural capital. Previous studies of social networks, trust, civic participation, and other measures of social capital find strong positive relationships between higher education and these measures (Putnam 2000). In general, social capital is highly skewed toward people of higher socioeconomic status and such status can itself be regarded as a kind of social capital. Two competing hypotheses may be adduced about socioeconomic status and non-Western religions in the United States. High socioeconomic status would be predicted by the literature on selective immigration, which suggests that U.S. immigration policy has favored technologically skilled and other professional workers and their families (Hirshman, Kasinitz, and DeWind 1999; Bean and Bell-Rose 1999); it would also be predicted by the literature on religious conversion, which suggests that some kinds of conversion depend on exposure and cultural capital or occur through socioeconomically endogenous interreligious marriage (Roof 1993). Alternatively, low socioeconomic status is predicted by the more general literature on migration, which associates migration with political and economic displacement (Massey et al. 1987). Qualitative observations of Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus in the United States have suggested that these populations are probably fairly well educated on

average because of selective immigration policies that favor such training and because of selective patterns of conversion. However, little exists in the way of systematic evidence to say whether this is the case or not.

Political Engagement

Religious groups can exercise greater influence if their members participate in the political process than if they do not. Participation is also an indication that members feel enfranchised and have a legitimate stake in the democratic system (Verba and Nie 1972). It has generally been argued that democracy is stronger when religious groups participate in electoral politics. However, there has been variation in the past in the degree to which religious groups were excluded, or engaged in self-exclusion, from the political process. For instance, Catholics and Jews were said to be excluded well into the 20th century, and Protestant fundamentalists or evangelicals did not take an active part until the 1970s. Among the practitioners of non-Western religions in the United States, political engagement is likely to be restricted to the extent that members are immigrants who have not yet become citizens. In addition, anecdotal impressions suggest that non-Western religious groups in the United States may have differing propensities to take part in the political process. Muslims are thought to be relatively more involved, whereas Buddhists and Hindus are relatively less involved. However, an alternative hypothesis would be that the structurally marginalized position of non-Western religious groups discourages all of them equally from participating. Different measures of political participation are likely to show different patterns. Voting in national elections signals a willingness to participate in party politics that may not affect local neighborhoods or interests, but voting also depends on having acquired citizenship and a sense of political entitlement and responsibility. Political knowledge, in contrast, may depend more on exposure to television and newspapers, indicating general interest or familiarity but not a disposition to actively participate. Political knowledge might be less common among non-Western religious groups, though, if these groups serve as a kind of ethnic enclave that restricts interest in wider social issues.

Trust

Trust is a norm that encourages cooperation and a willingness to engage in social interaction that requires cooperation with people who may not be part of one's own group. This is a form of subjective integration that may be associated with a feeling of belonging, an attitude that increases the likelihood of participating, or a broader sense of cooperation and social cohesion (Fukuyama 1995). Generalized trust may be positively affected by the kind of in-group solidarity presumed to exist among members of religious communities and by religious beliefs about the trustworthiness of humankind. It may also be negatively influenced by feelings of marginalization, especially if there are scarce resources. In contrast, alienation or mistrust can be expressed toward specific targets, such as institutions or people in power. Although there may be a general disposition to trust others, this form of mistrust may indicate a relative sense of powerlessness or nonacceptance. It has been suggested that Muslims may especially feel alienation because of grievances toward U.S. policies in the Middle East. Alternatively, all non-Western religions may be associated with a sense of powerlessness in the United States. It is also possible that conversion to a non-Western religion is motivated or reinforced by alienation.

Interpersonal Integration

Like generalized trust, interpersonal networks may be a resource that provides useful information, social support, and protection against feelings of isolation and anomie. Talking with or visiting neighbors has been regarded as one such form of social capital (Putnam 2000). Interpersonal

networks can also be distinguished in terms of verticality, that is, inclusion of prominent or influential people. For members of non-Western religions, anecdotal evidence suggests that living in predominantly Christian neighborhoods while practicing a different religion might result in isolation from both immediate neighbors and community leaders. Alternatively, some anecdotal evidence suggests that Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus may be concentrated in religiously or ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods, meaning that isolation from immediate neighbors would be unlikely, whereas ties to leaders in the wider community might remain sparse. Evidence from studies of attitudes in the public at large leaves open possibilities for both isolation and integration: relatively few Americans, for example, say they would not want to have Muslims as neighbors, and this proportion is no higher than for Jews or Protestant fundamentalists (Jaffe-Berkowitz 2002); but considerably fewer Americans report having Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists as close personal friends than having Jews as close personal friends (Hackett 2002); and a majority of Americans say they are “favorable” toward American Muslims and American Buddhists, but these proportions are significantly lower than for Protestants, Catholics, or Jews (Kohut 2001).

Religion

As social capital, religion provides opportunities both to cross social boundaries and forge ties with people from other groups, thus bridging into the wider society, and to maintain a distinctive identity. Thus, questions about religious integration are complex. Out-group ties will probably be more frequent among all minority religions than for Christians, but may not be as common for Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists as for a more established group like Jews. Attendance at religious services is ambiguously related to social integration but interesting because of what it may indicate about differences in religious traditions. Frequent attendance can be a way of focusing time and attention on one’s own group and thereby of cultivating ties that may or may not bridge into the wider society. But frequent attendance may also be an indication of assimilation. Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and Jews are thought to have traditionally emphasized regular weekly attendance less than Christians, but anecdotal evidence suggests that these groups may be adopting Christian norms in this regard in the United States.

DATA AND METHODS

We analyze data from the 2000 Social Capital Benchmark Survey (SCB), which was conducted among 29,233 people, 3,003 of whom were respondents selected from a nationally representative sample and 26,230 selected in random samples from the populations of 41 local communities (for methodology and list of communities, see Putnam 2001). The SCB survey provides an unusual opportunity to examine the social characteristics of members of Muslim, Buddhist, and Hindu communities in the United States. Unlike studies with fewer numbers, it provides sufficient cases for comparisons when multivariate procedures are used. Unlike the few other studies with large numbers of cases (e.g., Kosmin and Lachman 1993), it includes a wider variety of information that bears on questions about social integration. And unlike surveys conducted among particular religious groups, it permits comparisons among the three non-Western groups and with Jews and Christians. The principal limitation is that the local communities were not selected randomly; however, they are diverse regionally and in size and the respondents within each were selected randomly. Because the survey was conducted in English (or Spanish), it does not include non-English-speaking practitioners of non-Western religions in the United States. Following Winship and Radbill (1994), we use unweighted data because they provide less biased and more consistent results and smaller standard errors than weighted data (in preliminary analysis we compared our results with results using the weight factor included in the data set and with results for “svy estimators” in Stata).

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF RELIGIOUS PREFERENCES,
SCB SURVEY, 2000

	Weighted by fweight		Unweighted	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Christian	23639	80.8	23489	80.4
Nonblack Muslim	114	0.4	109	0.4
Black Muslim	60	0.2	60	0.2
Asian Buddhist	98	0.3	67	0.2
Non-Asian Buddhist	137	0.5	164	0.6
Asian Hindu	94	0.3	87	0.3
Non-Asian Hindu	27	0.1	35	0.1
Jewish	361	1.2	424	1.5
Other Non-Christian	447	1.5	464	1.6
No Religion	3897	13.3	3947	13.5
Don't know/refused	365	1.2	387	1.3
Total	29,239	100.0	29,233	100.0

The distribution of religious identities in the SCB data is shown in Table 1. Religion was determined by asking respondents: "What is your religious preference? Is it Protestant, Catholic, another type of Christian, Jewish, some other religion, or no religion?" Those who said some other religion were asked: "And what would that be?" Response categories in which interviewers recorded answers included Muslim, Mohammedan, Islam; Buddhist; Hindu; and several other options (including Native American and New Age). Because of interest in possible differences between converts and nonconverts, we distinguish between black and nonblack Muslims, Asian and non-Asian Buddhists, and Asian and non-Asian Hindus. The SCB results are similar to religious distributions obtained in representative surveys of U.S. adult population samples; for instance, Hout and Fischer (2001) observe that the General Social Survey and several other surveys estimate the nonreligious population at around 13 or 14 percent, and Pipes (2001) cites two surveys estimating the number of American Muslims at 1.5–1.8 million, or approximately the same as derived by multiplying the SBC figure times the adult population.

Although the SCB included a variety of questions intended as measures of social capital, many of the questions were not relevant for purposes of examining the social integration of non-Western religious groups, either because the targets (e.g., friends, businesses, co-workers) might or might not be members of a particular religious group and thus do not provide a clear measure of wider social integration, or because they focused on other kinds of diversity (racial, ethnic, and sexual preference). We selected 10 dependent variables that provided two measures each of socioeconomic integration, political integration, trust, network integration, and religious integration. Mnemonic variables are from Putnam (2001). The variables are: education (in years); INCOME (total 1999 family income in dollars); VOTEUS (voted in 1996 presidential election); POLKNOW (correctly or almost correctly named one or both senators from state); TRUST ("Most people can be trusted" = 1; "You can't be too careful in your dealings with people" = 0); ALIEN1 ("The people running my community do not really care much what happens to me," where agree strongly or agree somewhat = 1); ISOLATN (recode of NEISOC, where "talk with or visit immediate neighbors" only several times a year or less = 1); BLEADER (where has personal friend who is a "community leader" = 1); BREL (where has personal friend with "different

religious orientation" = 1); and ATTEND (a recode of RELATEND estimating total number of weekly services attended per year).²

We examine the relationships using ordinary least squares and logistic regression analysis. In the tables that follow, dummy variables are included for Muslim (nonblack), Muslim (black), Buddhist (non-Asian), Buddhist (Asian), Hindu (Asian), Jewish, and Other Religion; Christian thus becomes the comparison category; persons with no religious preference (or who responded don't know or refused) are excluded (non-Asian Hindus are included in the Other Religion category because of their small numbers). We control for gender by including a dummy variable (male = 1) and we include age in years as a control; preliminary analysis showed that both were associated with most of the social integration variables. We also include two dummy variables for MSA status (urban and suburban); these variables are generally significant and help take account of the sampling bias toward urban communities. For each dependent variable, we include three models: one in which only the religion and control variables are included; a second in which ethnicity (dummy variables for black and Asian) are included; and a third in which ethnicity and education are included. The ethnicity variables provide a way of taking into consideration whether effects observed for, say, Asian Buddhists are attributable to ethnicity or to religion. In the absence of questions about foreign birth or immigration, these controls provide a way of assessing the effects of being Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu, net of possible differences between immigrants and converts. The models including education provide a way of determining if relative levels of social integration may be interpreted as the results of differences in education. Following Greeley and Hout (1999) and Wilcox (1998), we report OLS or logistic regression coefficients, standard errors, probabilities of significance (Wald statistic), degrees of fit, and R^2 s.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents the results for religious differences in levels of education and income. For education, Model 1 shows that the relationships between being Muslim (nonblack), Buddhist (Asian and non-Asian), or Hindu (Asian), compared with being Christian, and having higher levels of education, are all significant and positive, controlling for age, gender, and MSA status. In Model 2, which introduces controls for being black and for being Asian, the relationship for Muslim (nonblack) becomes insignificant, the relationship for Buddhist (Asian) becomes insignificant, and the relationships for Buddhist (non-Asian) and Hindu (Asian) remain significant and positive. Table 2 also shows the results for family income, which differ in several important respects from those for education. Whereas there is a significant positive relationship between being Muslim (nonblack) and having higher education, this relationship is negative for income (significantly so when race and ethnicity are controlled). When education is controlled, the negative relationship between being Muslim (nonblack) and income becomes stronger. The relationships between being Muslim (black) and income are not significant. The relationship between income and being Buddhist (Asian) is significant in Model 1, but not in Models 2 and 3, which suggests that the positive relationship is because of ethnicity and education. The relationships for Buddhist (non-Asian) and income are positive and appear to be a function of higher levels of education. The same is true of the relationships for Hindus (Asian).

The results presented in Table 3 for political engagement (VOTEUS and POLKNOW) yield a mixed picture of the social integration of non-Western religions. In the three models for voting, a dummy variable is included for U.S. citizenship to take account of the possibility that some respondents may not have voted because they were not citizens. It is helpful to look first at the results for Jews since these results suggest what the pattern might be if members of non-Western religions resembled Jews. In Model 1, there is a significant positive relationship between being Jewish and having voted, taking into account age, gender, and MSA status; and in Model 3, when education is controlled, this relationship becomes insignificant, suggesting that the reason Jews are more likely to vote than Christians is that Jews are more likely to have higher levels of

TABLE 2
OLS REGRESSION OF EDUCATION AND INCOME ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES (EXCLUDING NONRELIGIOUS), SCB SURVEY, 2000

Independent Variable	Education (Years)		Income (Thousands)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Muslim (nonblack)	0.630* (0.253)	0.402 (0.253)	-3.832 (3.283)	-6.550* (3.290)	-9.171** (3.016)
Muslim (black)	0.012 (0.337)	0.421 (0.338)	-5.081 (4.294)	1.883 (4.312)	0.411 (3.953)
Buddhist (Asian)	0.939** (0.321)	0.030 (0.349)	8.504* (4.291)	-0.292 (4.648)	0.006 (4.261)
Buddhist (non-Asian)	1.390*** (0.206)	1.353*** (0.206)	7.566** (2.645)	6.840** (2.636)	-0.485 (2.419)
Hindu (Asian)	2.612*** (0.281)	1.713*** (0.313)	17.945*** (3.736)	9.317* (4.145)	1.212 (3.802)
Jewish	1.984*** (0.128)	1.941*** (0.128)	19.443*** (1.700)	18.591*** (1.695)	9.007*** (1.561)
Other religion	0.459*** (0.120)	0.413*** (0.119)	-5.067** (1.543)	-5.661*** (1.538)	-7.780*** (1.413)
Urban	0.515*** (0.050)	0.570*** (0.050)	3.662*** (0.646)	4.720*** (0.650)	1.823** (0.598)
Suburban	0.501*** (0.052)	0.500*** (0.052)	10.726*** (0.674)	10.828*** (0.672)	8.360*** (0.618)
Age	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.008*** (0.001)	-0.180*** (0.013)	-0.188*** (0.013)	-0.149*** (0.012)
Male	0.160*** (0.034)	0.150*** (0.034)	7.023*** (0.441)	6.841*** (0.439)	6.200*** (0.403)
Black	—	-0.483*** (0.052)	—	-8.364*** (0.669)	-6.176*** (0.615)
Asian	—	0.848*** (0.143)	—	7.629*** (1.863)	3.085 [†] (1.709)
Education	—	—	—	—	5.004*** (0.077)
Intercept	13.719*** (0.067)	13.762*** (0.067)	50.816*** (0.876)	51.663*** (0.877)	-17.346*** (1.334)
<i>N</i>	24,278	24,278	22,178	22,178	22,150
<i>R</i> ²	0.026	0.031	0.044	0.052	0.203
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	0.026	0.031	0.044	0.051	0.203

[†]*p* < 0.10; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01; ****p* < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

education. Since Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus are also more likely than Christians to have higher levels of education, we might expect the same results. However, the relationship between being Muslim (nonblack) and having voted is negative (though insignificant) in Model 1, remains negative (significant) in Model 2 when race is controlled, and becomes somewhat more negative in Model 3 when education is also controlled (none of the relationships for black Muslims are significant). The likelihood of having voted is also significantly lower among Buddhists (Asian)

TABLE 3
LOG ODDS RATIOS FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF VOTING AND
POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(EXCLUDING NONRELIGIOUS), SCB SURVEY, 2000

Independent Variable	Voting			Political Knowledge		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Muslim (nonblack)	-0.908*** (0.247)	-0.788** (0.249)	-1.090*** (0.267)	-0.258 (0.206)	-0.404† (0.207)	-0.537* (0.216)
Muslim (black)	-0.118 (0.302)	-0.092 (0.305)	-0.249 (0.326)	-0.225 (0.271)	0.468† (0.273)	0.388 (0.282)
Buddhist (Asian)	-0.993** (0.306)	-0.116 (0.333)	-0.156 (0.362)	0.211 (0.254)	-0.056 (0.277)	-0.067 (0.287)
Buddhist (non-Asian)	0.441* (0.205)	0.421* (0.205)	0.040 (0.219)	0.817*** (0.171)	0.741*** (0.171)	0.493** (0.179)
Hindu (Asian)	-1.121** (0.418)	-0.245 (0.438)	-0.609 (0.451)	-0.671** (0.245)	-0.921*** (0.269)	-1.355*** (0.274)
Jewish	0.782*** (0.154)	0.766*** (0.154)	0.172 (0.164)	0.777*** (0.108)	0.693*** (0.108)	0.276* (0.112)
Other religion	0.077 (0.110)	0.091 (0.110)	0.024 (0.119)	0.054 (0.095)	0.011 (0.095)	-0.090 (0.099)
Urban	0.171*** (0.048)	0.189*** (0.049)	-0.038 (0.052)	0.045 (0.039)	0.151*** (0.040)	0.028 (0.042)
Suburban	0.101* (0.050)	0.115* (0.050)	-0.083 (0.053)	-0.009 (0.041)	0.006 (0.041)	-0.112** (0.043)
Age	0.055*** (0.001)	0.055*** (0.001)	0.064*** (0.001)	0.025*** (0.001)	0.024*** (0.001)	0.028*** (0.001)
Male	0.013 (0.033)	0.011 (0.033)	0.003 (0.035)	0.503*** (0.027)	0.493*** (0.027)	0.499*** (0.029)
Citizen	4.329*** (0.169)	4.314*** (0.169)	4.312*** (0.177)	—	—	—
Black	—	-0.051 (0.048)	0.164** (0.051)	—	-0.836*** (0.044)	-0.774*** (0.045)
Asian	—	-0.900*** (0.135)	-1.286*** (0.147)	—	0.147 (0.114)	-0.040 (0.118)
Education	—	—	0.355*** (0.008)	—	—	0.233*** (0.006)
Intercept	-5.719*** (0.183)	-5.684*** (0.183)	-10.736*** (0.232)	-1.401*** (0.054)	-1.325*** (0.055)	-4.638*** (0.102)
<i>N</i>	24,301	24,301	24,253	24,341	24,341	24,278
Wald chi ²	5710.477	5755.218	8152.814	1349.584	1740.244	3542.222
Degrees of freedom	12	14	15	11	13	14
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.196	0.198	0.281	0.040	0.052	0.105

† $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

and Hindus (Asian) than it is among Christians. When ethnicity is held constant, the differences for Buddhists and Hindus become insignificant, and the coefficient for Asians suggests that low voter participation rates among Asians account for these religious differences. The results in the right-hand columns of Table 3 for the political knowledge variable show that it is negatively associated with being Muslim (nonblack), significantly so when education is controlled, unrelated to being Muslim (black or nonblack) or being Buddhist (Asian), positively related to being a non-Asian

TABLE 4
LOG ODDS RATIOS FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF TRUST
AND ALIENATION ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES
(EXCLUDING NONRELIGIOUS), SCB SURVEY, 2000

Independent Variable	Trust			Alienation		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Muslim (nonblack)	-0.329 (0.203)	-0.457* (0.203)	-0.571** (0.209)	0.745*** (0.196)	0.754*** (0.198)	0.824*** (0.200)
Muslim (black)	-0.807** (0.294)	0.082 (0.296)	0.008 (0.302)	0.041 (0.273)	-0.163 (0.275)	-0.108 (0.277)
Buddhist (Asian)	0.208 (0.250)	0.163 (0.272)	0.167 (0.279)	0.170 (0.258)	0.039 (0.282)	0.044 (0.284)
Buddhist (non-Asian)	0.571*** (0.164)	0.470** (0.165)	0.208 (0.170)	-0.147 (0.175)	-0.116 (0.175)	0.062 (0.177)
Hindu (Asian)	0.866*** (0.232)	0.840** (0.256)	0.528* (0.261)	0.111 (0.228)	-0.025 (0.255)	0.188 (0.257)
Jewish	0.449*** (0.102)	0.339*** (0.102)	-0.043 (0.105)	-0.194† (0.111)	-0.163 (0.111)	0.076 (0.113)
Other religion	-0.060 (0.093)	-0.111 (0.094)	-0.194* (0.097)	0.205* (0.096)	0.216* (0.096)	0.263** (0.098)
Urban	-0.313*** (0.039)	-0.182*** (0.039)	-0.306*** (0.041)	0.227*** (0.042)	0.191*** (0.043)	0.264*** (0.043)
Suburban	-0.166*** (0.041)	-0.144*** (0.041)	-0.249*** (0.042)	0.061 (0.045)	0.053 (0.045)	0.117** (0.045)
Age	0.012*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.013*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)	-0.005*** (0.001)	-0.006*** (0.001)
Male	0.112*** (0.027)	0.093*** (0.027)	0.068* (0.028)	0.115*** (0.028)	0.121*** (0.028)	0.137*** (0.029)
Black	—	-1.071*** (0.044)	-1.030*** (0.046)	—	0.256*** (0.042)	0.203*** (0.042)
Asian	—	-0.114 (0.112)	-0.293* (0.115)	—	0.177 (0.116)	0.288* (0.117)
Education	—	—	0.199*** (0.006)	—	—	-0.122*** (0.005)
Intercept	-0.384*** (0.052)	-0.265*** (0.053)	-3.026*** (0.095)	-0.721*** (0.057)	-0.759*** (0.057)	0.901*** (0.094)
<i>N</i>	24,341	24,341	24,278	24,341	24,341	24,278
Wald chi ²	398.077	1035.703	2437.854	145.144	183.678	689.260
Degrees of freedom	11	13	14	11	13	14
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.012	0.031	0.072	0.005	0.006	0.023

† $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Buddhist (a result that becomes weaker when education is controlled), and negatively associated with being Hindu (more so when education is controlled). On balance, these results suggest that political knowledge is probably influenced more by education than by religion.

The results for trust (TRUST and ALIEN1) also show a mixed pattern. The odds of expressing generalized trust (Table 4) are significantly lower among Muslims (nonblack) than among Christians and Jews when race, ethnicity, and education are controlled. Among black Muslims, the relationship with trust is significant and negative, but becomes insignificant when race is controlled and when both race and education are controlled, a finding that is consistent with

other studies (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Wuthnow 1998). The coefficients for Buddhists (Asian) are also insignificant. In contrast, the coefficients for Buddhists (non-Asian) and Hindus (Asian) are positive, but become weaker or insignificant in the model that includes education. In short, Buddhists and Hindus resemble Jews in having relatively high levels of generalized trust, which appear to be a function of high levels of education. The findings for the alienation variable in the right-hand columns of the table indicate that alienation (i.e., feeling that community leaders do not care about one's interests) is significantly more likely among Muslims (nonblack) than among Christians or Jews. The coefficients for Muslims (black), Buddhists (Asian and non-Asian), and Hindus (Asian) are not significant.

Models for the two measures of interpersonal integration (ISOLATN and BLEADER) shown in Table 5 suggest that members of non-Western religions are integrated into their neighborhoods but that their interpersonal networks may be more limited in providing ties to community leaders. The likelihood of being isolated from immediate neighbors is not statistically different among Muslims, Buddhists, or Hindus than among Christians, but with education controlled this likelihood is greater among Muslims (nonblack). The other variables in the models suggest that neighborhood isolation is lower among older people, among males, and among those with higher levels of education, but higher among persons living in urban areas. In the right-hand columns, the odds of having a friend who is a community leader are not significantly different among either of the Muslim groups than among Christians, but these odds *are* lower among Asian Buddhists and Hindus (even when ethnicity and education are controlled) and among non-Asian Buddhists in the model that controls for level of education. Jews are more likely to have friends who are community leaders than are Christians, and this difference appears attributable to differences in levels of education.

In Table 6, having a personal friend with a different religious orientation (BREL) is significantly more likely among Muslims (nonblack), marginally more likely among Muslims (black), and significantly more likely among Buddhists (Asian and non-Asian) than it is among Christians. When ethnicity and education are controlled, these differences remain (except for nonblack Muslims). It is also worth noting that the likelihood of having religiously exogenous friends is higher among the two groups that are probably converts (non-Asian Buddhists and black Muslims) than among their counterparts (Asian Buddhists and nonblack Muslims).

The results shown in the right-hand columns of Table 6 indicate that attendance (ATTEND) at religious services tends to follow patterns consistent with the different norms of the three religious groups, rather than converging around the Christian norm of frequent attendance. Attending religious services frequently occurs at about the same rate among Muslims (black) as among Christians, at least when race and education are controlled; however, frequent attendance is significantly lower among Muslims (nonblack), Buddhists, Hindus, and Jews than it is among Christians.

The overall profile from these variables is that American Muslims (nonblack) are more likely than their Christian counterparts to be college educated, but less likely to earn high incomes; are less likely to be politically knowledgeable and less likely to vote; more distrustful of people in general and significantly more likely to feel alienated from community leaders; less likely to have contact with immediate neighbors, but no less likely to feel connected to community leaders; more likely to have interreligious friendships; and less likely to participate regularly at their places of worship. On most of these measures, black Muslims resemble the Christian population more so than the nonblack Muslim population, especially when race is controlled.

Buddhists are more likely than Christians to have graduated from college, but only non-Asian Buddhists are more likely to earn high incomes (because of their higher educational attainment). Asian Buddhists are less likely to vote (which appears to be more of an ethnic than a religion effect), but are no less politically knowledgeable. Non-Asian Buddhists are more likely to be politically knowledgeable (a function of education), but are not more likely to vote. Asian and non-Asian Buddhists also differ on trust. Because of education differences, non-Asian

TABLE 5
LOG ODDS RATIOS FROM THE LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF NEIGHBORHOOD ISOLATION AND LEADER TIES ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT VARIABLES (EXCLUDING NONRELIGIOUS), SCB SURVEY, 2000

Independent Variable	Neighborhood Isolation			Ties to Community Leaders		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Muslim (nonblack)	0.416 [†] (0.223)	0.437 [†] (0.225)	0.490* (0.228)	-0.173 (0.200)	-0.145 (0.201)	-0.215 (0.205)
Muslim (black)	0.512 [†] (0.290)	0.070 (0.292)	0.122 (0.294)	0.150 (0.262)	-0.087 (0.264)	-0.159 (0.268)
Buddhist (Asian)	0.022 (0.312)	-0.287 (0.337)	-0.283 (0.339)	-0.635* (0.270)	-0.682* (0.292)	-0.702* (0.295)
Buddhist (non-Asian)	-0.033 (0.210)	0.046 (0.210)	0.208 (0.212)	-0.166 (0.161)	-0.134 (0.162)	-0.336* (0.165)
Hindu (Asian)	0.332 (0.253)	0.009 (0.283)	0.207 (0.285)	-1.709*** (0.324)	-1.761*** (0.342)	-2.046*** (0.344)
Jewish	0.076 (0.131)	0.155 (0.131)	0.353** (0.134)	0.280** (0.100)	0.314** (0.100)	0.018 (0.103)
Other religion	0.129 (0.116)	0.157 (0.116)	0.187 (0.118)	0.282** (0.093)	0.296** (0.094)	0.251** (0.095)
Urban	0.145** (0.053)	0.053 (0.054)	0.107* (0.054)	-0.344*** (0.039)	-0.385*** (0.039)	-0.486*** (0.040)
Suburban	-0.022 (0.056)	-0.046 (0.056)	0.009 (0.056)	-0.382*** (0.041)	-0.390*** (0.041)	-0.479*** (0.042)
Age	-0.017*** (0.001)	-0.016*** (0.001)	-0.017*** (0.001)	0.011*** (0.001)	0.012*** (0.001)	0.014*** (0.001)
Male	-0.159*** (0.036)	-0.144*** (0.036)	-0.142*** (0.036)	-0.059* (0.027)	-0.053* (0.027)	-0.078** (0.027)
Black	—	0.571*** (0.047)	0.535*** (0.048)	—	0.293*** (0.040)	0.383*** (0.041)
Asian	—	0.427** (0.130)	0.528*** (0.131)	—	0.096 (0.112)	-0.033 (0.114)
Education	—	—	-0.109*** (0.007)	—	—	0.154*** (0.005)
Intercept	-0.840*** (0.070)	-0.929*** (0.071)	0.553*** (0.115)	-0.207*** (0.052)	-0.247*** (0.053)	-2.382*** (0.092)
<i>N</i>	24,341	24,341	24,278	24,341	24,341	24,278
Wald chi ²	325.098	467.918	736.781	426.560	479.474	1359.209
Degrees of freedom	11	13	14	11	13	14
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.015	0.021	0.033	0.013	0.014	0.040

[†] $p < 0.10$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.01$; *** $p < 0.001$ (two-tailed tests).

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

Buddhists are more likely to express generalized trust, but Asian Buddhists are not more or less likely to express trust. Neither appear to be more or less alienated from political leaders than the Christian population. Their likelihood of having contact with immediate neighbors is about the same as among Christians, but both are less likely to be connected with community leaders. Religiously, their friendships are more exogenous and they attend services less often than Christians.

Hindus (Asian) differ from Christians in ways that largely resemble those of Buddhists, although Hindus are even more likely than Buddhists to have graduated from college and earn

TABLE 6
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF INTERRELIGIOUS FRIENDS AND OLS
REGRESSION OF RELIGIOUS ATTENDANCE ON SELECTED INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES (EXCLUDING NONRELIGIOUS), SCB SURVEY, 2000

Independent Variable	Interreligious Friends			Religious Attendance		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Muslim (nonblack)	0.658* (0.307)	0.540† (0.309)	0.471 (0.314)	-3.882† (2.120)	-3.923† (2.125)	-4.180* (2.118)
Muslim (black)	0.813† (0.431)	1.465*** (0.433)	1.411** (0.437)	5.957* (2.798)	1.815 (2.811)	1.540 (2.802)
Buddhist (Asian)	1.098* (0.466)	1.127* (0.486)	1.152* (0.490)	-19.010*** (2.728)	-22.573*** (2.959)	-22.551*** (2.949)
Buddhist (non-Asian)	2.056*** (0.455)	1.956*** (0.455)	1.698*** (0.459)	-14.302*** (1.712)	-13.694*** (1.708)	-14.538*** (1.709)
Hindu (Asian)	0.399 (0.312)	0.449 (0.341)	0.099 (0.346)	-10.422*** (2.360)	-14.110*** (2.625)	-15.314*** (2.618)
Jewish	0.951*** (0.173)	0.841*** (0.173)	0.423* (0.176)	-14.712*** (1.067)	-14.097*** (1.064)	-15.354*** (1.070)
Other religion	0.964*** (0.163)	0.926*** (0.163)	0.889*** (0.167)	-11.268*** (1.001)	-11.095*** (0.998)	-11.314*** (0.997)
Urban	0.053 (0.047)	0.188*** (0.048)	0.100* (0.049)	0.503 (0.412)	-0.224 (0.415)	-0.579 (0.415)
Suburban	0.150** (0.050)	0.175*** (0.050)	0.086† (0.051)	-0.088 (0.431)	-0.258 (0.430)	-0.555 (0.430)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.002* (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	0.165*** (0.008)	0.174*** (0.008)	0.179*** (0.008)
Male	0.014 (0.033)	-0.008 (0.034)	-0.026 (0.035)	-2.745*** (0.283)	-2.629*** (0.282)	-2.728*** (0.282)
Black	—	-0.842*** (0.044)	-0.794*** (0.046)	—	5.171*** (0.429)	5.479*** (0.429)
Asian	—	-0.196 (0.141)	-0.414** (0.144)	—	4.493*** (1.189)	3.910*** (1.186)
Education	—	—	0.207*** (0.006)	—	—	0.670*** (0.053)
Intercept	1.324*** (0.065)	1.458*** (0.066)	-1.356*** (0.109)	21.733*** (0.558)	20.975*** (0.560)	11.745*** (0.923)
<i>N</i>	24,341	24,341	24,278	24,206	24,206	24,144
<i>R</i> ²	—	—	—	0.041	0.047	0.053
Adjusted <i>R</i> ²	—	—	—	0.040	0.046	0.052
Wald chi ²	155.345	493.819	1561.537	—	—	—
Degrees of freedom	11	13	14	—	—	—
Pseudo <i>R</i> ²	0.006	0.020	0.065	—	—	—

†*p* < 0.10; **p* < 0.05; ***p* < 0.01; ****p* < 0.001 (two-tailed tests).

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.

high incomes. Hindus are less likely to vote than Christians and are less knowledgeable on the political knowledge variable. They are more likely to express generalized trust (partly a function of education), and no more likely to express alienation. They do not differ from Christians in the likelihood of having contact with neighbors, but are less likely to be connected with community leaders. Religiously, their friendships are more exogenous and they are less frequently involved at their places of worship than Christians.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The extent to which Muslims, Buddhists, and, especially, Hindus differ from Christians in having attained higher education is noteworthy. The high rate of educational attainment among members of non-Western religions points to strong possibilities for integration into the wider society through professional and managerial occupations, income, cultural awareness, and opportunities for educating children. In other research, questions measuring social distance toward minority groups are generally more positive for higher status target groups than for lower status groups, suggesting that Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists are also more likely to be accepted by the Christian population than if their educational attainment was lower (Selznick and Steinberg 1969). The results for income add one possible qualification to these conclusions. The fact that Muslims (nonblack) do not earn higher incomes, despite having higher levels of education, suggests the possibility of experiencing status inconsistency accompanied by frustration and alienation. There are at least two possible explanations for this apparent discrepancy between education and income among Muslims. One is underemployment (i.e., employment in lower paying jobs than educational levels would suggest) resulting from language barriers, more recent immigration, or discrimination. A second, since the income variable is for *family* income, is that Muslims may be less likely to have two breadwinners in the family. This second possibility, however, is not supported when separate analyses are conducted for the odds of being a homemaker, not working, or having children in the household (not shown).

The picture of political involvement in these data suggests that educational capital has not yet translated into political integration in the same way it has for other religious groups. Muslims (nonblack), Asian Buddhists, and Hindus are all less likely than Christians to have voted. Although it is possible that the negative association between voting and being Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu has to do with recent immigration (e.g., since the 1996 election), the control for citizenship and a separate analysis of being registered to vote in 2000 (not shown), which yields similar results, argue against this possibility.

Generalized trust might at first appear to be a function of religious beliefs, since the odds for the trust variable are higher among Buddhists (non-Asian) and Hindus. However, the data suggest that ethnicity and education provide a better interpretation. It is also interesting that among the non-Western religious groups, only nonblack Muslims score higher than average on alienation.

The patterns for interpersonal integration give only modest support to the idea that members of non-Western religions are isolated from their immediate neighbors. In fact, given that blacks and Asians *are* more likely to be isolated from their neighbors than white Anglos, it may be that being a Muslim, Buddhist, or Hindu actually overcomes some of these effects of race and ethnicity. The exception is nonblack Muslims, for whom neighborhood isolation is significant when education is controlled. The fact that Buddhists and Hindus are less likely to have friends who are community leaders suggests a lack of integration into certain kinds of power arrangements.

Finally, the pattern of religious integration might be summarized as one of interreligious linkages and sustained tradition, with one significant exception. Linkages beyond particular religious communities are evident in the fact that Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus indicate having friends whose religious orientations differ from their own with greater frequency than Christians do. This finding is consistent with other research that suggests that random social encounters by members of minority populations would be expected to include *more* out-group contacts than by members of the majority (Goldstein and Warren 2000); they nevertheless suggest that members of non-Western religions *are* engaged in social interaction with the Christian population. The question about attendance at religious services, while ambiguous, suggests that none of the non-Western groups (except for black Muslims) attend weekly services as often as Christians do, a pattern that suggests continuing faithfulness to distinct traditions. These continuing differences point to at least one way in which non-Western religions are *not* adapting to Christian practices (Yang and Ebaugh 2001).

The limitations of these data include the fact that the surveys are not truly representative of the national population, that internal variations within particular religious groups (such as between practitioners of different Buddhist traditions) cannot be examined, that the relatively small numbers of members of non-Western religions prevents being able to reliably examine interaction terms in the regression models, and that more variables relevant to the question of social integration are not available. Because the data exclude non-English speakers, estimates of social integration are probably more positive than would be the case for all practitioners of non-Western religions in the United States. Further qualitative and quantitative research is needed to more fully examine patterns of social integration.

The larger picture suggested by these data is that Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus in the United States have significant social resources that represent either integration or the potential for integration into the wider society. These resources include college training, income, political knowledge, norms of generalized trust, interpersonal networks, and religious connections. There are some variations in these resources, but Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus are structurally similar in most respects. Selective immigration, selective conversion, and an emphasis on educational attainment are probably the most important factors contributing to these resources for integration.

There is also a lack of social integration according to several of the measures. The low rates of voting among Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus are striking, especially in view of arguments about new immigrant groups or underrepresented populations sometimes feeling a special responsibility to participate in the electoral process. High rates of alienation among nonblack Muslims, compared with those among Christians, suggest a further lack of social integration, as does the lack of ties to community leaders among Buddhists and Hindus. The dimension along which social integration among non-Western religious groups appears to be most deficient, therefore, is political integration. The high levels of political participation among Jews suggests that this deficiency can be overcome. Yet it is at present clearly an aspect of the social location of non-Western religious groups in the United States.

This exploration also suggests the value of including a structural perspective in the study of non-Western religious groups. Although phenomenological approaches are valuable as sources of descriptive and interpretive complexity and variation, the structural location of non-Western religious groups provides a context in which to understand larger social relationships. In the case of Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus in the United States, social and cultural resources hold promise for integration into the wider society, but a sense of political exclusion or marginality is also a continuing consideration.

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NOTES

1. The term "social integration" refers to the same kind of inclusion in the wider society that studies of economic "incorporation" (Portes and Zhou 1993; Nee and Sanders 2001) have emphasized, but focuses on multiple aspects of social capital.
2. For political participation, we used VOTEUS instead of CIVPART (a five-item index included in the SBC data) because it is the only political item unambiguously indicative of participation outside one's immediate group or community; Putnam (2001) also cautions against using the CIVPART variable.

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